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Abstract. This article describes difficulties in causally linking programs intended to spread democracy
with the appearance of democracy.
One commonality of many political entities professing to be representative democracies is the
embracing of the spread of democracy as a highly valued political objective that has strategic security,
ethical, and moral benefits. These benefits are assumed not only for those entities that already are
democracies but also those that are democracies of the future--i.e., all non-democratic entities.
However, there are a number of difficulties in demonstrating that programs intended to spread
democracy actually do so.
First, how does one identify and sort out the effects of an infinite number of phenomena that precede
the appearance of a desired objective--e.g., democracy--and make the determination of which
phenomena had what causal effects? The real world is often uniquely unsuited to so-called controlled
experimentation and systematic empirical observation. Yet there seems to be a penchant among
program developers and implementors for assuming that their intended effort to achieve a desired
objective preceding the appearance of that desired objective is prima facie evidence that the former
caused the later. However, a similar penchant for assumption is often shared by clinical paranoids and
the superstitious among others. Often enough, the desired objective occurring after an act intended to
achieve that objective has not been caused by that intended act.
Even if the above concern can be resolved, there is a second difficulty. Case studies that purport to
support the efficacy of various democracy-producing techniques often focus on structure and process to
the exclusion of function. In other words, the effort to operationalize the construct of democracy as
dependent variable may emphasize its trappings but not its essence. One may point to the presence of a
constitution, a tricameral political edifice, elections, candidates, ballots, voting, even the name of a
country--e.g., the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or the Democratic Republic of the Congo--but
not necessarily assume that these inevitably signify democracy. Non-democratic political leaders
certainly are aware of this. Just as Soviet workers pretended to work and the Soviet regime pretended
to pay, non-democratic leaders pretend to build and maintain democracy while some erstwhile, earnest,
and ersatz seekers of democracy pretend to see it. The latters' pretending can lead to a pretension that
may be unconscious and fueled by the fervent desire to see the ideal become the real, conscious and
fueled by the desire to be perceived as correct, or yet other psychological combinations.
A third difficulty is a cognitive response set characterizing many efforts to evaluate the effects of
programs to spread democracy--whether or not these evaluations are formally or informally effected by
the very individuals or sponsors behind the programs' planning and implementation. The evaluators'
response set--as implied above--is primed to find success and approximations to it. More interestingly,
the response set seems biased against the very notion that democracy programs may result in a
worsening of situations--so that democracy is even and ever farther away.
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Democracy programs may help spread democracy where there is a will but less of a way. However, such
programs may lose their way and attenuate the will. Where there is a way but no will or no way and no
will, there is little to suggest what will or won't be at least somewhat effective. Yet politics and policy
processes may demand democracy program development and the choice of very "hard targets." As can
be seen, political psychologists interested in helping to spread democracy have much to contribute. (See
Reichenbach, R. (1998). The postmodern self and the problem of developing a democratic mind. Theory
and Research in Social education, 26, 226-237; Rosenberg, T. (October 25, 1999). America finds
democracy a difficult export. The New York Times, p. A26; Sekulic, D., & Sporer, Z. (1998). Toward
democracy or to the new authoritarianism? The case of Croatia. Humboldt Journal of Social Relations,
24, 129-169; Sullivan, J.L., & Transue, J.E. (1999). The psychological underpinnings of democracy: A
selective review of research on political tolerance, interpersonal trust, and social capital. Annual Review
of Psychology, 50, 625-650; Warwick, P.V. (1998). Disputed cause, disputed effect: The postmaterialist
thesis re-examined. Public Opinion Quarterly, 62, 583-609.) (Keywords: Democracy, Evaluation.)
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